It has never had to be exercised in England and Wales. It has in This does not, however, mean that judges are accountable to Parliament for their decisions in. Up until the House of Lords was the supreme court of appeal on points of law for the whole of the UK in civil cases and for England, Wales and Northern. Generally these branches are: executive, legislative and judicial. in his own way by adding that the separation between executive and legislature should be partial, The legislative power in the UK is held by the Parliament.
Circuit and District Judges can be removed by the Lord Chancellor. However, he can only do so if the Lord Chief Justice agrees. This does not, however, mean that judges are accountable to Parliament for their decisions in particular cases, save insofar as Parliament may legislate to reverse the effect of a decision or change the law as established or interpreted by a judicial decision.
It is right to suggest that judges are able to rule that the acts of public bodies are unlawful and to decide against the Government in a particular case.
Indeed, this is a powerful check on the power of the State against the individual. Many of the examples seen in the media, or commented on by politicians, tend to focus on criminal matters or on Human Rights, but there are many other examples of judicial oversight enabling the State to redress unforeseen outcomes of its own legislation. It is however wrong to suggest that the judiciary can, using the Human Rights Actoverturn legislation.
Parliament and the judiciary
A declaration of incompatibility does not strike down legislation or remove it from the statute book, as is the case in some jurisdictions. In the United States, for example, the Supreme Court can declare that legislation is not valid law because it is unconstitutional. Declarations of incompatibility under the Act, however, leave the validity of the particular law intact. They simply require Parliament to consider amending the law to render it compatible with the provisions of the European Convention on Human Rights.
The ultimate decision remains with Parliament and not the judiciary. Ultimately, the judiciary does no more, or less, under the Act than carry out its constitutional function of interpreting and applying the law enacted by Parliament.
They only have such power as Parliament gave them in the Human Rights Act His "fight" took the form of an endeavour by the means authorised by the Australian Constitution,  to amend the constitution so as to confer the requisite legislative power on the parliament.
That required means included the successful passage of a referendum. As it transpired, the referendum was not passed either by the requisite majority of the Australian States or by an overall majority and thus failed. The case stands to this day in Australia as an important example of the limits of our parliament's ability to circumscribe civil liberties, even of the promoters of unpopular causes. Very recently, when Papua New Guinea's Supreme Court held that the detention of asylum seekers on Manus Island violated the National Constitution,  the immediate response of the Prime Minister, the Honourable Peter O'Neill MP, was to state publicly that the government would abide the order of the court.
The point for present purposes is that the reactions of Prime Ministers Menzies and O'Neill were in conformity with the Latimer House Principles, whereas, with all due respect, the behaviour of President Mugabe and the statement made by Prime Minister Gillard were not.
In relation to relations between the parliament and the Executive on the one hand and the judiciary on the other, these principles do not exist to protect the vanity or sensibilities of the judiciary.
The reasoning employed in a judgement is not immune from criticism. What should be avoided is criticism which is subversive of the separate, constitutional role of the judiciary to interpret and apply the law of the land or, put another way, criticism which is subversive of the rule of law.
Statements which suggest that the judiciary must adhere to the views of the Executive are likewise subversive. There is a corollary of this so far as the judiciary is concerned. It is not the function of the judiciary to have the general administration of Acts of Parliament or to formulate and implement national policy.
These are the functions of the Executive. The concern of the judiciary is only with the legality of the discharge of these functions by the Executive, not with their merits. If, in so doing, the court avoids administrative injustice or error, so be it; but the court has no jurisdiction simply to cure administrative injustice or error.
The merits of administrative action, to the extent that they can be distinguished from legality, are for the repository of the relevant power and, subject to political control, for the repository alone.
But that need is no less in, for example, a case concerning the judicial review of a decision concerning whether an individual is entitled to a particular benefit under statute than it is in a case involving the constitutionality of an action implementing high national policy. Further, it is not only in these public law cases that that need arises.
It is the daily business of the courts to determine a range of other civil disputes, notably including tax liability disputes, to which a body politic or official or agency thereof is a party. That is not to mention criminal cases in which the Crown or the State will always be a party. In all such cases, a failure on the part of the other branches of government to respect the separate, adjudicative role of the judiciary is subversive of the rule of law. The exercise of judicial power must entail deference not just to the separate role of the Executive but also to the separate role of parliament.
A not infrequently encountered need for this deference occurs when a court is urged by a Minister or other officer or agency of the Executive to adopt a construction of legislation favoured by the Executive but which does not accord with the meaning of that legislation as disclosed by its text.
In these circumstances, it is not for a court to construe the legislation on the basis of what parliament might have specified if it were desired to implement a particular policy. For to do that would, in effect, be to legislate. Instead, the court must construe the legislation on the basis of the text parliament has chosen to approve. If that text has imperfectly implemented that policy, it is for parliament, if so disposed, to amend the legislation so as more exactly to implement that policy.
This approach to the construction of legislation must inform the judiciary in cases great and small. That persistence and the related behaviours of King Charles in endeavouring to govern without parliament and to impose taxes without parliamentary authority led in the midth century to civil war between the King and his supporters and parliament and its supporters.
King Charles lost that war and paid for his adherence to his principles with his life. But the subsequent English experience after that civil war was that regicide and the triumph of parliament and a republican ideal led not to government by parliamentary authority but instead to a military dictatorship under Lord Protector Oliver Cromwell, backed by the New Model Army.
On Cromwell's death, peace was preserved by a restoration of the monarchy but on terms that, over the course of the reign of King Charles II and his successors, led to an acknowledgement of the supremacy of parliament within the field of its legislative competence and to the affirmation of the separate role of an independent judiciary by express provision for the continued tenure in office of judges, subject to capacity and good behaviour.
The instruments by which these features of what has proved to be an enduringly successful system of government were enshrined were: The Declaration of Breda of 4 Aprilby which King Charles II undertook, if restored to power, to issue a general pardon for crimes committed during the Civil War and the period of the Protectorate for all those who acknowledged him as the lawful monarch; to uphold the right of those who purchased property during that period to retain that property; religious toleration; to pay arrears owing to members of the army, and that the army would be reconstituted under the service of the Crown.
In this lie the origins of the Westminster system of government in which Ministers appointed by the Crown or other Head of State hold office only while they enjoy the confidence of parliament. This declaration was later recited and the rights it specified enacted by the English Parliament in the Bill of Rights Eng. The Act of Settlement Engwhich provided for the succession to the Throne and for the terms of that succession after the failure of King William and Queen Mary and their successor, Queen Anne to produce a surviving heir.
It affords the judiciary a tenure not enjoyed by Chief Justice Coke and facilitates the discharge of the judicial function he defended. In England and Wales, provision for this tenure of this kind for the senior judiciary is now found in s 11 of the Senior Courts Act UK. Furthermore, no arm of government is supposed to abdicate power to another arm.
The premise of this construct is not a harmonious relationship but a checking and balancing of power. Inevitably, the checking provides the blueprint for, and generates, tension between the three arms of government. It is unrealistic to think that it can be eliminated.
Courts and Tribunals Judiciary | Judges and parliament
But it can be reduced, if the Executive and the Judiciary recognise 'that each has a role to perform and that each is better equipped to carry it out than the other'. As Professor Pearce has said, '[f]or the good of our society, it is better for the combatants to realise that they are there to serve the people, not their own ends, and to adapt their conduct accordingly'". The virtue and value of the Latimer House Principles is that they specify conduct which can reduce the inevitable tensions between the branches of government and thus serve the end of the good of a society.
Moral right of author asserted. Non-exclusive publication right granted to: The views expressed in this speech are personal, not those of either Australian or Papua New Guinean courts or governments.
A controversy of land between parties was heard by the King, and sentence given, which was repealed for this, that it did not belong to the common law: A Force for Freedom. Barry Rose Law Publishers Hostettlerp. National Library of Australia, "Trove" database: Each accessed, 12 May As the Act of Settlement as in force today in the United Kingdom, see legislation. The appointment of a Justice of the High Court shall be for a term expiring upon his attaining the age of seventy years, and a person shall not be appointed as a Justice of the High Court if he has attained that age.