What is the relationship between faith and theology

what is the relationship between faith and theology

Philosophy Between Faith and Theology: Addresses to Catholic severed it from every connection with the wealth of non-scientific experience. Many Protestant and Roman Catholic theologians in the twentieth new model of the relation between faith and reason. The first requisite of theology is faith: that which we believe (the To believe is a personal event, i.e., something that happens between two personal beings. thus gives faith a deep personal dimension in relation to God.

In the first place, like modernity's meta-philosophy, Peperzak's too is a meta-philosophy, authoring ultimate, universal, authoritative claims about how philosophy must function. It too functions as a higher tribunal legitimizing philosophical viewpoints and de-legitimizing others, though in a much more inclusive manner than the philosophical high court of modernity did. The claims contained within this meta-philosophy are addressed to those of any faith including atheistic, agnostic faith with the expectation that interlocutors need not share one's particular faith to assent to them.

Insofar as one believes that one's arguments will stand on their own before an interlocutor, who, it is hoped, will consider his or her full experience in considering them, this meta-philosophy appears to be independent of the lived existence from which it may have sprung. Of course, one's particular faith might "motivate" the development of this meta-philosophy, but the arguments for the meta-philosophy, though begun in private faith, take on an autonomous life of their own, insofar as the normative constraints of philosophy itself demand that one ought to abandon arguments that are not convincing even if they would support one's faith or embrace convincing ones even if they seem to lead in a direction opposed to one's faith.

Faith and Reason | Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy

Autonomy seems inherent in the philosophical attitude itself. Moreover, one might use one's pertinence to a private faith as an example of the rooted engagement with existence for which one argues, but one's faith then serves as an occasion for an insight into the structural features of rooted engagement that, it can be argued, all kinds of faiths share, rather than serving as a dogmatic first-premise with which those of different faiths must comply.

Within the reflective, philosophical attitude undertaken from within a first-person perspective, one's private faith recedes to a degree into anonymity, and autonomy characterizes the philosophical consideration of the reasons for a meta-philosophy. Perhaps all this simply amplifies on what Peperzak means by describing philosophy as a universalizing that brackets without repressing its religious underpinnings. But how might these underpinnings, one's rooted existence, affect the process of philosophical reasoning leading to the meta-philosophical position?

TOPIC 3: FAITH AND THEOLOGY (1) – Introduction to Theology | O Clarim in English

Apart from the previously mentioned deployment of one's experience of private faith as an example leading to autonomous insight into rooted engagement -- and the modernist meta-philosophy that Peperzak criticizes might have ruled out a consultation of such experience -- one's rooted existence might also function causally.

In this case, however, while one focuses on developing reasons for the meta-philosophy, one's background experience of private faith might be inclining one to find reasons convincing beneath the level of the conscious focus on the arguments, behind one's back, as it were.

However, the discussion of whether the reasons given are true and why proceeds on a different plane than psychological explanations of why one finds arguments appealing, as Husserl's critique of psychologism in Logical Investigations showed. Otherwise, Peperzak's own meta-philosophy would simply be a psychological expression of his Catholicism, and nonbelievers and non-Catholics need not take seriously its claim to be true. In fact, often in looking back after one has developed what one takes to be true reasons one speculates about the underlying psychological factors that might have influenced one's recognition of their truth.

Thus if one develops reasons for a meta-philosophy that seems to make room for one's private faith, one might hypothesize that one's commitment to that private faith was "influencing" all along the development of these arguments for the meta-philosophy. But in these cases, one detects the influences of rooted existence on philosophizing from a third-person perspective, outside the first-person viewpoint of the one engaged in giving reasons for the meta-philosophy that one would never claim to be true simply because they accord with one's private faith.


In summary, one's private faith might serve as an initial motivator in arguing for a meta-philosophy like Peperzak's, as an example leading to insight into rooted engagement, or as a psychological source disposing one to accept the arguments for a more inclusive meta-philosophy. Nevertheless, in none of these ways is the philosophical autonomy responsible for determining whether the arguments for the meta-philosophy are true undermined.

what is the relationship between faith and theology

Philosophy's autonomy in developing and criticizing reasons is ultimately a matter of philosophical responsibility not to assent to arguments simply because they proceed from one's enrootedness or because they deny that enrootedness either but because they are true. Perhaps, though, this explanation of how rooted existence influences "philosophizing" merely clarifies how philosophy's autonomy is "relative" to the conditions of its emergence, as Peperzak claims.

It is important, though, to preserve a strong role for philosophical autonomy with reference to one's private faith and rooted existence. It is certainly quite possible that an unprejudiced philosophy, reflectively poised over and against that enrootedness, might find it instructive and endorse the values emerging from it, though the modernist meta-philosophy Peperzak opposes might not have allowed for this.

At the same time, philosophy has the capacity to criticize the private faiths of rooted existence, so that, for instance, it can reject the misogynist, anti-scientific, or non-ecumenical biases that Peperzak himself thinks ought to be abolished from religious faith. Philosophy ought not to be the ideological pawn of one's existential enrootedness, even though its criticisms can be a matter of loving service of it; in fact, it does not serve if it is a mere ideological pawn.

Again, these comments perhaps fill in some details of what Peperzak means when recommending that philosophy play a self-aware, self-critical role in concrete human life. Another interesting discussion in the second half of Peperzak's book has to do with his arguments for onto-theology, which include metaphysical discussions of God and proofs for God's existence 35which have been much maligned in postmodernist thought, and which many believe yield a God who is "too pale, too cold and boring, too abstract and unreligious" for those touched by Biblical faith However, avoiding the extremes of fideism and the rational deducibility of God 36 and unwilling to abandon years of metaphysicsPeperzak contends that onto-theology need not be an obstacle to approaching God Instead it can be integrated with prayer and spirituality 91and it can reveal for us our own transcendence toward God 66, and enable us to explore the transcendent attributes of a God before whom we can not only dance but also worship.

Figures like Augustine and Anselm anticipate Peperzak's view of onto-theology insofar as their speculations about God frequently appeared within prayer addressed to God One aspect of Levinas's thought relevant to this discussion of onto-theology, mentioned but not fully exploited, has to do with the appearance of the third person who moves us beyond the dyad of the face to face onto the plane of reason and philosophy for the sake of all others.

The giving of a philosophical account of one's own beliefs, so central for Plato, is for Levinas a matter also of ethical responsibility to another and to all others.

what is the relationship between faith and theology

Among these the Most Blessed Virgin Mary stands out. The act of faith The faith has the following main characteristics: The believer accepts and incorporates concrete truths to his or her vision of reality such that his or her faith possesses a specific and well-defined content.

Authentic faith goes beyond the realm of the senses and reaches the invisible world of supernatural mysteries. These mysteries are intensely real. The person whom God addresses is free to believe or not to believe. Faith is a choice of the will that tends toward God and decides to give himself to Him. Faith may take root or not in the heart of a person. Jesus attributes this fact directly to the freedom and responsibility of the person who has been invited to believe.

The signs contained in Revelation do not force man to accept necessarily. The one who hears the voice of God, or sees the signs that GOd carries out, is always free to respond or not. The freedom of the believer thus gives faith a deep personal dimension in relation to God. It is produced in a luminous chiaroscuro in which the believer realizes that to believe makes sense. Faith goes beyond reason, just as grace goes beyond nature, but it neither destroys nor ignores it.

Faith is not bound by the limits of reason.

  • Faith and Reason

Neither does it need to receive, in a way of speaking, the approval of reason. This does not mean, however, that faith is something of the sentiment or feeling. Faith is not absurd or irrational. Faith has nothing to do with superstition or with other strange religious behavior.

If we offend the principles of reason, our religion will be absurd and ridiculous. Believers have some experience of this fact. We human beings are not capable of reaching any knowledge that can save us salvific knowledge without the grace of God cf CCC, no They want to believe but they cannot.

They admire believers, and even envy them in the good sense, but they cannot manage to reproduce interiorly the attitude and vision of those believers.